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He cannot be questioned about what He does; 
it is they who will be questioned. 
 





This thesis presents a response drawn from the Islamic theological tradition to the 
argument from evil, or the contention that the suffering in our world is evidence against 
theism. Two types of arguments from evil are distinguished: one claiming that God 
would eliminate suffering qua morally and rationally perfect agent, and one claiming that 
God would eliminate suffering qua possessor of certain traditionally posited divine 
attributes—mercy, compassion, love, goodness, etc.—in virtue of the standards for 
volitional activity that are implicit in the possession of these attributes. This thesis is 
primarily concerned with the first type of argument, and argues that since the Islamic 
view that God transcends moral standards can be reasonably held, suffering does not 
constitute even prima facie evidence against Islamic theism. Two lines of argument for 
the applicability of moral standards to God are considered and rejected. Finally, the 
outline for an Islamic response to the second type of argument is proposed. This consists 
in a variant on skeptical theism that emphasizes the limits of our knowledge of God’s 





EPIGRAPH .............................................................................................................. iii 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. iv 
CONTENTS .............................................................................................................. v 
I. Introduction: Two Types of Arguments from Evil ............................................... 1 
II. From Theodicy to Metaethics .............................................................................. 5 
III. Divine Volition and Normative Reasons ......................................................... 14 
IV. The Appeal to Moral Intuition ......................................................................... 25 
V. Divine Transcendence and Human Knowledge ................................................ 29 
VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 35 





I. Introduction: Two Types of Arguments from Evil 
 
In western philosophy of religion, the heading ‘Problem of Evil’ has by now accumulated 
an impressive variety of arguments for the falsity of theism and the irrationality of 
theistic belief. Unifying such arguments is the contention that the basic doctrines of 
standard theism are inconsistent with the facts about the suffering our world contains. 
One popular way of spelling out the alleged inconsistency gives central place to 
normative concepts1 to express the idea that God, as a morally and rationally perfect 
agent capable of eliminating suffering, should be expected to do so. The assumption 
behind this ‘normative’ form of the argument from evil (henceforth NAE) is that there are 
standards for the assessment and justification of God’s actions, and that these standards 
obligate God to prevent suffering. The Islamic theological tradition,2 however, denies that 
such standards exist. According to Islamic theology, not only does God have no moral 
obligations, but evaluative and normative judgements are not even applicable to God’s 
volitional agency; God is neither a moral nor a rational agent. This paper defends the 
coherence of this response to the inconsistency charge raised by the NAE. 
In approaching a topic as vast in the literature as the problem of evil, I find it 
appropriate to begin with a distinction. In addition to what I have called the ‘normative’ 
formulation, the problem of evil is sometimes raised in the form of what might be called 
a ‘divine attribute’ variant of the argument from evil (DAAE). The general thrust of this 
 
1 By normative concepts, I mean concepts that involve reference to standards for the justification of any 
sort of volitional activity. We necessarily refer to moral or rational standards, respectively, whenever we 
ask whether a given course of conduct is morally or rationally justified. 
2 My references to traditional Islamic theology are to the Sunni creedal tradition represented by the Ash’ari 
and Maturidi schools. For background on both schools, and a broad treatment of their approaches to the 
argument from evil, see Sherman A. Jackson, Islam and the Problem of Black Suffering (Oxford: Oxford 





sort of argument is as follows: there are certain traditional characterizations of God—as 
merciful, for example, or loving or compassionate (or ‘good’ in its non-normative sense, 
where the statement that “God is good to his creation” is not equivalent to the statement 
that God is morally good)3—and these characterizations are at least poorly manifested in 
the way our world runs, if not outright flouted. Suffering and cruelty are prevalent. This, 
the argument concludes, compels us at least to deny that there exists any divine being 
characterized in the traditional way. 
I will not give both construals of the argument from evil equal focus in this 
paper—my attention will be primarily on the normative formulation. The reason is that 
the issues raised by the two variants are different enough to merit separate comprehensive 
treatment. Whereas the NAE has normative claims at its basis, the DAAE is by contrast 
distinctly theological. By this I mean that it centers the discussion on questions about the 
nature of God, and how God’s actions might be expected to manifest His nature in the 
observable world. To make sense of the DAAE requires that we first understand what a 
given religious tradition means when it calls God merciful or loving or compassionate or 
good. What is the conceptual relation, for one thing, between these divine attributes on 
the one hand, and the corresponding human virtues that enjoy the same names on the 
other? In what sense are they analogous? Any atheological argument founded on the 
divine attributes requires some knowledge of what the attributes in question respectively 
entail about God’s creative relation to suffering. Is such knowledge available? Through 
what channels? How do we reconcile the possibility of such knowledge with God’s 
transcendence and uniqueness? These are the sorts of questions that religious theology 
 






sorts out in consultation with the relevant scriptural and mystical traditions. I, for one, 
lack enough familiarity with the enormous scholarly tradition of Islamic theology to 
present more than the outline of a response a Muslim theologian might give to some of 
these questions. 
But a completely different type of question drives the NAE: the question of 
whether it is wrong for God to allow preventable suffering. ‘Wrongness’ is a moral term. 
In contemporary philosophy, morality is often treated as if it has special, universal 
import—as if its subject matter is conceptually applicable to all volitional activity, in 
virtue either of the nature of rational agency itself or of the fundamental moral 
constitution of the world. Many moral philosophers would argue that the questions of 
whether God has moral duties and of what these duties are can be studied independently 
of religious theology. They can be studied because the topics at issue—the nature of 
rational agency and the fundamental order of the world—are accessible for common 
inquiry. Normative questions are thus distinguished by a special sort of common 
accessibility. Hence the unique appeal of the NAE, which purports to rest on premises 
that are “fair play,” so to speak, rather than on any particular religious tradition’s 
understanding of the Divine. 
The implications of this distinction for the approach I present to the argument 
from evil are as follows. Skeptical theism, usually employed as a response to the NAE, is 
best redeployed and set against the DAAE. The final section of this paper shows, in bare 
outline, how this may be done. This frees up space to stage the dialectic between the 
atheologian and the Muslim theologian about the NAE, which will concern the main part 





A few words now to frame this dialectic. As I see it, the argument from evil is 
most effective when it charges the theist with internal inconsistency. When the 
atheologian deploys the argument in this way, his charge is as follows: “On the one 
hand,” he begins, addressing the theist, “your beliefs commit you to holding that a being 
who wills to eliminate suffering is in complete control over the world, but at the same 
time you acknowledge that the world contains significant suffering. You can’t rationally 
hold these two beliefs at the same time—you’ve got to give something up. But since you 
can’t give up the belief that there is tremendous suffering in the world, your theism has to 
go.” Presented like this, the argument from evil is a challenge to the theist: either square 
away the alleged inconsistency in your own beliefs, or plead guilty to charges of positive 
irrationality. 
This internal line of attack immediately fails against the Muslim theologian when 
it comes to the NAE. For he does not hold that God wills to eliminate suffering. In fact, 
he believes that the suffering that exists is God’s will and creation; to say that this 
detracts from God’s perfection is to posit moral standards independent of God. The 
applicability of moral standards, in the Islamic view, is limited to created rational agents. 
Now, presented with this response to the argument from evil construed as an 
internal inconsistency argument, the atheologian may turn to an external strategy. The 
external strategy is a frontal attack: rather than turning the theist’s beliefs on him, the 
external argument aims to demonstrate that the theist’s beliefs are wrong. In the Muslim’s 
case, the beliefs at issue are the claims that God is not obligated to prevent suffering, and 
that it is not an imperfection in God to allow suffering that He could have prevented. The 





with the aim of showing the theist that there is, demonstrably, an obligation upon God to 
prevent suffering, such that it would be incompatible with God’s perfection to dismiss 
this obligation. 
The discussion will be a metaethical one, since the issue at hand concerns the 
metaphysical grounds of moral responsibility and the possibility of moral norms that 
transcend human activity. The first approach I will consider for the argument that it is 
God’s duty to prevent suffering is an appeal to normative reasons. But I will argue that 
God’s volition can consistently be held to be unrestricted by the norms of our practical 
reason. Second, I will consider an approach that appeals to our strongest moral intuitions 
to support the claim that preventing undue suffering is intrinsically wrong. My response 
to this approach will be that, equipped with a metaethics that views moral obligations as 
divine commands, the Muslim theologian can consistently accommodate our intuition 
that suffering is wrong without conceding that God has duties. 
After showing how the NAE can be dealt with, I will turn briefly in closing to the 
DAAE. For if my argument to that point is successful, it will turn out that the argument 
from evil worth studying from the perspective of Islamic theology is in fact the divine 
attribute variant. I present what I take to be a promising sketch for a line of response 
available to the Muslim theologian: a version of skeptical theism adapted for the DAAE. 
 
II. From Theodicy to Metaethics 
 
Contemporary debate about the normative version of the argument from evil invites 
theodicy. The central questions are ‘why’ questions, and wherever they are not, they 
resolve into ‘why’ questions. Theodicy is the quest for God’s justifying reasons for 





atheologians think they cannot. I begin this section by framing this debate, and then I 
suggest what may be wrong with it. 
Let us begin first of all with an outline of the NAE: 
(1) An omnipotent and omniscient being knows how to prevent and is able to 
prevent any instance of unjustified suffering. 
(2) A morally perfect being prevents all instances of unjustified suffering that 
it knows how to prevent and is able to prevent. 
(3) If some being prevents all instances of x, then no instances of x exist. 
From 1-3, 
(4) If an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being exists, then no 
instances of unjustified suffering exist. 
But, 
(5) Some instances of unjustified suffering exist. 
Therefore, 
(6) No omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being exists. 
The term ‘unjustified suffering’ is central in this argument, so let me define it. An 
instance of suffering4 is ‘unjustified’ if and only if there are no morally justifying (or 
morally ‘sufficient’) reasons to allow it to exist, whether these reasons are conceived as 
rational imperatives, outbalancing goods, or simply right-making properties. Conversely, 
 
4 Note that I refer to ‘suffering’ where others sometimes speak of ‘evils.’ The reason I do this is to avoid 
any axiological suggestions that need not constrain the argument from evil. The aim is to be neutral in the 
debate between consequentialism and deontology, for the argument from evil is committed to neither 
theory of normative ethics. Whereas a consequentialist would determine that allowing suffering is wrong 
because it produces negatively valued states of affairs, a deontological theory that instead pays attention to 
the wrong-making features of actions can also sustain the common intuition that it is wrong to cause 
suffering. See Michael Tooley, “The Problem of Evil,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015), 





an instance of suffering is ‘justified’ if and only if there are morally justifying reasons to 
allow it to exist. For surely there is sometimes good reason to permit suffering or even to 
directly bring it about. For instance, a surgeon who performs an especially painful 
operation to save a life is surely not at fault. From the surgeon’s perspective, the 
operation is a justified suffering, because it is the only available causal means for 
securing a much greater good: the life of the patient. 
But any ordinary surgeon is not at all like an omnipotent agent, who is 
unrestricted by causal limits. Surely, an omnipotent surgeon would be at fault for 
resorting to a painful operation to achieve what could otherwise be achieved by a simple 
act of volition. The range of sufficient moral reasons thus seems significantly narrower 
for omnipotent agents. What sort of moral reasons would permit an omnipotent being to 
cause suffering? Is it even possible for an omnipotent agent to be justified in causing 
suffering? If we grant that it is a moral duty to prevent suffering, then, given that 
omnipotent agency is limited only by the constraints of logical possibility, we can at least 
say this much: if an omnipotent agent is to be justified in the act of allowing suffering, 
the act must be a logically necessary condition for the attainment of something morally 
worthwhile. It would not suffice that the suffering be merely a sufficient condition for 
something good, no matter how good; an omnipotent agent should have a justifying 
reason for specifying that the good be obtained through the suffering, and not some other 
means. 
But what justifying reason could this be? This is the question that it is the task of 
theodicy to answer.5 Some theodicists have proposed that this justification is the 
 
5 The term ‘theodicy’ is also sometimes used in a broader sense to signify any attempt to resolve the 





maximization of good states of affairs in the world. On this conception, every instance of 
suffering is necessary for the bringing about of ‘greater goods,’ and, in the big picture, of 
the ‘best possible world.’ Other theologians, for various reasons including dissatisfaction 
with the theory’s consequentialist implications, think that the notion of justified suffering 
need not appeal to purely quantitative considerations. On John Hick’s ‘soul-making’ 
theodicy, the experience of suffering is a necessary part of the divine plan for human 
spiritual development. Only in an imperfect and often harsh world can humans learn to 
freely respond to difficulties such that they grow into the perfected beings God intends 
them to be. Hick’s underlying idea is that the process is necessary—“ready-made” 
perfect humans cannot be procured “by divine fiat.”6 Alvin Plantinga has argued 
extensively for the special value of a world in which created beings exercise libertarian 
free will to do good. The preservation of this free will is sufficient moral reason for God 
not to intervene when created beings choose act in ways that cause suffering.7 Marilyn 
McCord Adams argues that ‘horrendous evils,’ or experiences of suffering so severe that 
it seems to sufferers that their life cannot be good for them, can be “made meaningful 
through integration into that person’s, on the whole overwhelmingly felicitous, 
relationship with God.”8 The reason people are made to experience horrors is that those 
very horrors experienced in the world will, in the afterlife, become channels for “mystical 
identification with the suffering of Christ.”9 
 
6 John Hick, “Soul-Making and Suffering,” in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn M. Adams and Robert M. 
Adams (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990), 168. 
7 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 30. 
8 Marilyn M. Adams, “Introduction,” in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn M. Adams and Robert M. Adams 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990), 23. Emphasis mine. 





While the theodicist is committed to identifying morally justifying reasons for 
suffering, the evidentialist atheologian takes the project of theodicy from the opposite 
angle. To be sure, he concedes the validity of theodicy, that is, concedes the hypothetical 
possibility that God could be morally justified in permitting instances of suffering. 
William Rowe, for example, allows that, 
What is evil in itself may sometimes be good as a means because it leads to 
something that is good in itself. In such a case, while remaining evil in itself, the 
intense human or animal suffering is, nevertheless, an evil which someone might 
be morally justified in permitting.10 
Rowe thus accepts a certain measure of evidential responsibility: since he wants to argue 
that there are cases of unjustified suffering, he takes it upon himself to provide an 
evidential argument that the theodicist’s proposed moral reasons for suffering do not 
adequately extend to all actual cases of suffering. Against the theodicist’s efforts to show 
that all the suffering in the world is justified, the evidentialist atheologian must show that 
some of the suffering in the world is unjustified. 
Rowe’s evidential strategy for accomplishing this works as follows: we have 
probable evidence that unjustified suffering exists because we regularly observe cases of 
‘apparently pointless suffering’—intense suffering from which it seems obvious that no 
compensating good follows. He illustrates this with an example that he intends to be 
representative of real-world cases of intense suffering: a fawn is trapped in a natural 
forest fire, is “horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death 
 
10 William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” in The Problem of Evil, ed. 





relieves its suffering.”11 Since we can detect no greater good that required the fawn to 
suffer so intensely, and we have no good reason to think that some free created agent is 
responsible, Rowe thinks such a case would be very difficult for the theodicist to explain. 
The best conclusion we can draw is that there was no morally sufficient reason for the 
fawn to suffer so intensely. Rowe argues that even if we happened to be mistaken about 
the pointlessness of the suffering in this one case, there is such a great number of similar 
cases and otherwise such a great variety of ‘apparently pointless suffering’ that it is 
reasonable to believe that at least some unjustified suffering exists.12 
In the recent literature, many of those writing on behalf of theism have rallied 
under a response to this sort of move called ‘skeptical theism.’ Skeptical theists typically 
appeal to human epistemological limitations in order to raise objections against the 
crucial premise in the NAE that moves from our knowledge of what would morally 
justify the existence of all the suffering in our world to the observation that the needed 
justification does not appear to obtain. A common line for skeptical theists is that, for all 
the instances of suffering in the world, “there are outweighing goods connected to them 
that are entirely outside our ken.”13 As finite beings with manifest cognitive limitations, 
we cannot expect to grasp exactly how God is justified in allowing the world’s suffering 
to exist. We simply cannot hope to reach reasonable conclusions about whether an 
appropriate justification obtains by merely consulting our own familiar standards of 
justification. Assuming we have sufficient positive reason to think that God exists, we 
 
11 Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” 129-130. 
12 Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” 131. 
13 Stephen J. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the 
Evils of ‘Appearance,’” in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn M. Adams and Robert M. Adams (Oxford: 





have no reason to doubt that all the suffering in the world is justified. Skeptical theism 
thus takes the project of theodicy from yet another angle: although theodicy is a fruitless 
endeavor for humans to pursue, the question that theodicy seeks to answer is still valid. 
The operative assumption for skeptical theists is still that it makes sense, in principle, to 
apply moral standards to God’s actions—the caveat is just that we are handicapped when 
we attempt to apply these standards to God. 
But one objection to skeptical theists targets this caveat with the aim of 
highlighting the normative costs of the skeptical theist position. The objection is that, on 
pain of skepticism about the content of moral standards as they apply to us, which means 
moral skepticism, we must assume that we can come to reasonable conclusions about 
whether the suffering in our world is justified. For if we assume that we cannot do so 
because the range of justifying goods is vastly, vastly larger than we know, then we must 
assume that we can never make adequate moral decisions on the basis of consequences. 
But since it is plausible that we frequently face moral decisions that depend, at least in 
part, on assessing the consequences, we are left with a “paralyzing moral skepticism” in 
such cases.14 Therefore, even factoring in the possibility that there are justifying goods 
beyond our cognitive reach, the traditional theist—who certainly does not want to admit 
moral skepticism—must assume that we can reach reasonable conclusions about whether 
instances of suffering are justified. This can be done by inductively assessing the 
likelihood that the instances of suffering before us are justified, taking as our basis what 
we do know about the content of our moral standards for conduct, and factoring in our 
 
14 Stephen J. Wykstra, “Beyond the Impasse: Contemporary Moral Theory and the Crisis of Skeptical 





reasoning the possibility that these standards extend to right-making or justifying 
properties outside our ken.15 
Whether or not this objection to standard skeptical theism can be countered, let us 
now pause and ask a critical question. As we have seen, theodicists, evidentialist 
atheologians, and skeptical theists alike take as their point of departure the same crucial 
assumption: the assumption that God’s agency is governed by moral standards. This 
assumption is a necessary condition for the further assumption, implicitly endorsed by all 
three groups, that it is prima facie morally wrong for God to permit suffering—that 
suffering is unjustified “by default,” so to speak. Indeed, the way that the language of 
theodicy frames the debate serves in itself as a covert endorsement of these assumptions. 
Theodicists speak of ‘justified’ and ‘unjustified’ suffering, and of ‘goods’ that would 
overbalance suffering, as if the presence of a morally sufficient end is necessary to 
exonerate God in allowing suffering to exist. But is the assumption that guides all of this 
language reasonable? Is it reasonable to assume that God needs morally sufficient reasons 
to permit suffering? Is God even prima facie morally obligated to prevent suffering in the 
first place? 
It is here that the theist can hold—and the Muslim theologian does hold—that the 
discussion so far has been woefully misguided. The theodicist and the evidentialist have 
been answering the wrong question. It makes no sense to ask if God is morally justified 
in allowing suffering, since the assumption that standards of justification meaningfully 
apply to God is mistaken. And the skeptical theist has unnecessarily handicapped himself  
by endorsing this suggestion as well. For the objection that the skeptical theist is in 
 





danger of moral skepticism is only possible if skeptical theism is a view meant to defend 
the claim that God is morally justified in allowing the suffering that exists to exist. (This 
is why I think skeptical theism works best as a response to the DAAE, not the NAE.) 
The upshot of this all is that the NAE fails against the Muslim theologian since he 
holds that God is not a moral agent and thus has no moral obligation to prevent suffering. 
This way of casting off the NAE is so easy that it is surprising that so seemingly few 
contemporary religious philosophers have insisted on it.16 The obstacle appears to lie in 
making sense of the traditional ascriptions of goodness and justice to God, and I will say 
more about that in the final section. 
Assuming that the view that God is not a moral agent is consistent with (at least 
some forms of) traditional theism, can anything still be said in favor of the NAE? As we 
saw in the introduction, it is still open to the atheologian to argue for the external claim 
that the Muslim theologian is wrong—that God is a moral agent and does have a moral 
obligation to prevent suffering. The next two sections of this paper are concerned with 
this line of argument. The important thing to remember, though, is that the burden is on 
the atheologian to raise the costs of the Muslim theologian’s position. The problem of 
evil is only a problem for the theist when he sees good reason to accept the atheologian’s 
premises. The claim that God can have moral obligations thus requires a forceful and 
decisive argument (of the kind that philosophy rarely provides!). What sort of argument 
might this be? I will consider two arguments, one appealing to rational norms of conduct 
and another appealing to our moral intuitions, and I will argue that they do not provide 
the dialectical force necessary to produce a real problem of evil for Islamic theology. 
 






III. Divine Volition and Normative Reasons 
 
One way of arguing that God has moral obligations might be to appeal to the norms of 
reason that govern volitional activity—standards for willing that arise for volitional 
agents in virtue of nothing but practical rationality itself. The idea behind such an 
argument would be that, if it can be shown that there are universal norms of volition, and 
that these norms give rise to moral obligations, then God as a volitional agent must have 
moral obligations. I will argue that the argument fails because it cannot be shown that 
there are universal norms of volition as such. The insight we have into our own volitional 
natures only entitles us to make claims about the norms of human volition, or practical 
reason. It does not entitle us to extend the norms of practical reason to volitional agents 
as such. If this is true, then there is no obstacle to maintaining that God is not bound by 
rational norms. This accomplishes two things. First, it undermines the appeal to universal 
rational norms to ground God’s moral duty. Second, it shows that any metaethical view 
that includes moral rationalism—the plausible view that if an action is morally right then 
there is normative reason to do it, and if an action is morally wrong then there is 
normative reason not to do it—is susceptible to essentially the same objection from the 
Muslim theologian: that God cannot have moral obligations since He cannot have 
normative reasons, and He cannot have normative reasons since He is not bound by any 
norms of reason. 
Let us begin with the concept of a normative reason. Normative reasons can be 
understood by contrast with motivating reasons.17 A motivating reason is an explanation 
 






of an agent’s actual choices in terms of the actual reasons he acted upon. It is what you 
get when you ask the agent, “Why did you do that?” Such an explanation leaves aside the 
question of whether an agent’s choices are rationally justified. Normative reasons, by 
contrast, justify an agent’s choices. The very concept of justification implies some code 
of rules or ‘norms’ governing what constitutes a normative reason to do something and 
what does not. Normative reasons have a deontic character that is captured in the fact that 
we often express what an agent has normative reason to do in terms of what the agent 
‘rationally ought’ to do. The normativity of normative reasons means that they “do not 
merely describe a way in which we in fact regulate our conduct. They make claims on us; 
they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least, when we invoke them, we make 
claims on one another.”18 Normative reasons have a sort of binding force in and of 
themselves. For the moral rationalist, this helps to explain the normativity of morality. 
Because a ‘moral ought’ is always at least accompanied by (if not identical to) a ‘rational 
ought,’ moral rules bind us with the force of rational norms. (Note, however, that not 
every normative reason is a moral one; by most accounts there are non-moral normative 
reasons as well. This is captured in the fact that when an agent fails to be motivated by 
non-moral normative reasons, we simply call him irrational, but when these normative 
reasons are specifically moral reasons, we call the agent immoral, attaching special 
consequence to the judgement.) 
As I stated above, if moral rationalism is true, then God cannot have moral 
obligations unless there are indeed divinely-applicable rational norms: rules for the 
rational resolution of what God ought to do. But if the idea that rational norms govern 
 
18 Christine M. Korsgaard, “The Normative Question,” in The Sources of Normativity, ed. Onora O’Neill 





God’s agency—the idea that God has normative reasons to act or to not act—is denied, 
then the moral rationalist must deny that moral obligations apply to God. Our discussion 
thus turns to the nature of practical reasons. For the question whether God has normative 
reasons must begin with some idea about what gives practical reasons normativity in the 
first place. And this cannot be decided until we know what a practical reason is and what 
rational agency is. What we need is some theory of practical rationality. Only once an 
adequate theory is in place can it be used as a sort of premise from which to derive 
conclusions about rational normativity. 
According to a division that has become standard, there are three groups of 
theories about practical rationality: the Aristotelian, the Humean, and the Kantian. My 
argument is that, regardless of whether any of these theories is true, it can consistently be 
held in each case that God is not, by the standards of the theory, a rational agent, and 
hence is not subject to normative reasons. Let us examine the theories in turn. 
 Probably the closest of the three theories of practical rationality to Islamic 
metaethical thought is the view sometimes referred to as ‘Aristotelian’ or 
‘NeoAristotelian.’ On this conception, normative reasons apply to us in virtue of our 
specifically human nature. Rationality is a distinctly human faculty, and our choices are 
rational insofar as they are directed at the ultimate good for humans, at ‘human 
flourishing.’19 It is essential to this view that there is a perfected ‘final’ state of human 
existence that is the goal of rational activity.20 The ideal rational agent guides his 
volitional life by the pursuit of this final good, this ultimate end, gradually transforming 
 
19 Alasdair MacIntyre, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and 
Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2016), 10-12, 24-31. 





himself into a flourishing human. Aristotle himself identified this state of flourishing or 
eudaimonia with a complete life of activity in accordance with the virtues: both those of 
character, like temperance and courage, and those of thought, like wisdom and 
prudence.21 The Islamic tradition identified this state with the love of God.22 
Since the end of practical rationality on the view I have just described is the 
attainment of a final, perfected state of being, not only can it be consistently held on this 
view that God is not a rational agent, but it should be clear that God cannot be rational, 
cannot have normative reasons. On the Aristotelian view, the normativity of practical 
reasons derives from the normativity of some ultimate end. The ‘guidance’ provided by 
that ultimate end in shaping the course of our practical lives answers the question of what 
we ought to do and why we ought to do it in every instance of decision-making. Because 
it is the ultimate end of humans to love God, we have normative reason to act for the sake 
of that state of love in every decision we make. But it is absurd to think that God’s 
volitional activity is aimed at some final, perfect state of divine existence. God’s 
perfection is a metaphysical necessity, and it makes no sense to aim at something that is 
already established by necessity. Moreover, according to Islamic theology, God 
transcends time. Thus, He cannot become “more perfect” as a transformative result of 
rational activity. Thus, the Aristotelian view brings out the conclusion that God’s will is 
just not the sort of thing to which it makes sense to ascribe normative reasons. 
The atheologian must therefore look elsewhere for a theory of practical rationality 
that supports divine reasons. The popular Humean theory, to which we now turn, would 
 
21 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 9, 18. 
22 Syed M. N. al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental 





also be inadequate in this respect. On the Humean theory, there is just one basic principle 
of rationality and it is the instrumental principle: one should act to promote the 
satisfaction of one’s ultimate desires.23 There is more than one reason to think that this 
view cannot ground an obligation binding upon God to prevent suffering. 
First, there is worry that the theory itself is inadequate for grounding moral 
obligations at all. On the Humean theory, normative reasons are contingent upon the 
agent’s motivational nature; if an agent was so constituted as to derive ultimate 
satisfaction from the act of inflicting suffering on others no matter the consequences, he 
would have normative reason to inflict suffering on others. But on the operative 
assumption in this section that moral rationalism is true, this would mean that the agent 
lacks a moral duty to refrain from inflicting suffering on others. This does not do justice 
to our conception of moral requirements as ‘categorical,’ as having normative force 
independently of agents’ contingent motivational states and natures. 
The second problem with appealing to the Humean theory to ground divine 
normative reasons stems from the difficulty of attributing contingent motivational states 
to God. Understanding God’s actions as motivated by desires brings forth a problematic 
picture of divine agency as reactive and temporal. For the Muslim theologian, again, God 
is not in time such as to be affected in His “desiderative constitution” by the conditions of 
the moment and to react to them. God’s will is eternal; only its effects are in time. For 
God to be motivated by desires would thus imply that God has eternal desires that He 
somehow consulted “in eternity” “while” determining how to act. But an eternal desire is 
outside time, and thus can never be satisfied and cease to exist. It hardly seems a 
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perfection to want something eternally and never be satisfied. And the very concept of 
motivation by a want seems to imply a state of need and hence imperfection. The bottom 
line is that the Humean theory is a non-starter for the Muslim theologian, because 
according to Islamic theology God transcends motivational states like desires and 
inclinations.24 Thus it would be no use for the atheologian to appeal to the Humean 
theory in order to show how God could have normative reason to prevent suffering. 
Let us turn, finally, to the Kantian view of practical rationality. On the Kantian 
conception, normative reasons apply to agents in virtue of a universal rational nature that 
transcends humanity.25 The special feature of this rational nature in its practical aspect is 
that it acts on maxims. In fact, Kant identifies practical reason with the will,26 which he 
defines as “a faculty of determining itself to action in accordance with the representation 
of certain laws,” or maxims.27 The idea of a maxim is central. Kant thinks of maxims as 
‘subjective principles’ of action: they are the principles upon which agents actually 
choose to act. Maxims are principles of action that are valid for the agent. But they are 
more than just motivating reasons. A maxim universalizes a motivating reason and makes 
it into an exceptionless law. So whereas, “I gave the beggar a dollar because I found one 
in my pocket and I was feeling sympathetic,” is just a motivating reason, the law, “If I am 
feeling sympathetic and I find a dollar in my pocket, I will give it to the beggar,” is 
 
24 Seemingly anthropomorphic references in scripture, like those references to God’s pleasure and wrath, 
are understood according to the principle of “the exaltation of God above any attribution to Him of a 
likeness to something else.” Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Moderation in Belief, trans. Aladdin M. Yaqub 
(Chicago: Chicago UP, 2013), 57. 
25 Cullity and Gaut, “Introduction,” 4. 
26 H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Philadelphia: 
Pennsylvania UP, 1947), 82. 
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properly called a maxim. The predicament of rational agents, on the Kantian view, is that 
they need to issue their actions from their conception of some law. As rational beings, we 
ground all of our consciously willed actions in maxims.28 An “action” that has no maxim 
is unintelligible from the standpoint of practical reason; it is nothing but an event in 
nature, like the rustling of leaves in the wind. 
For Kant, a normative reason is an ‘objective principle,’ a principle for action that 
is valid not only for the agent, but for all rational agents as such.29 It is a law that would 
be a maxim for any agent if that agent were fully rational. The moral principle is one type 
of objective principle. The instrumental principle is another. But the moral principle is 
categorical: it is unconditioned by what agents happen to desire. So a moral maxim must 
be founded on a principle for action that is not only objective but categorical: a law that 
(1) is valid for all rational agents, and that (2) provides the determining ground for action 
without appealing to desires. But without desires as determining grounds for action, all 
that remains of the maxim that can serve as the determining ground for action is its 
inherent universal, lawlike nature, and also (because it aligns with an objective principle) 
its applicability to rational agents as such. Because the determining ground for action is 
no longer particularized by some desire, the action becomes necessary as law for all 
rational agents. The if in the law becomes simply, “if you are reasonable, you will do 
such and such.” The determining ground of a moral principle is simply to be reasonable, 
to consummate one’s rational nature. For a rational agent to refuse to determine his 
activity by moral maxims—maxims that align with the moral principle—is thus 
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irrational. Kant goes on to argue that the moral principle takes the shape of the what he 
calls the ‘categorical imperative,’ and to spell out this imperative in several different 
ways. What is important for our purposes is that he certainly would hold that the 
categorical imperative commands us to prevent undue suffering, at least to human beings. 
But why suppose in the first place that there is such an objective principle as the 
moral principle? Kant does not propose to give a proof that the moral principle exists. He 
simply points out that, without the moral principle as he has described it, our idea of 
moral duty would be nothing but “a vain delusion and a chimerical concept.”30 Moral law 
can only be conceptualized as a categorical principle that issues from practical reason 
itself. For the sake of argument, let us grant for now that this is a correct analysis of the 
concept of moral law (It certainly is not for a divine command theory of morality). For 
now, the question that concerns us is whether the moral law, this categorical principle of 
reason, applies to God as well as to us. 
 Kant seems to think that the categorical principle does apply to God. Recall that 
volition on Kant’s view is nothing but practical reason. As a volitional agent, God has 
practical reason just as we do, which means the same objective principles are valid for 
Him. To be sure, Kant distinguishes between the moral principle as an imperative 
expressing an ought, the form in which it appears to finite rational beings, who are 
tempted by inclinations of sense, and the principle as a mere law expressing a would, the 
form in which it appears to a perfectly good or holy will “already of itself necessarily in 
agreement with the law.”31 So, while Kant wouldn’t think God is ‘obligated’ to prevent 
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suffering, he does think God would necessarily prevent suffering in accordance with the 
principle of morality. That is sufficient for the NAE. 
 The objection that the Muslim theologian would raise against this view is that the 
conception of volitional agency that it presents, even if we grant its accuracy, is 
inappropriately extended to God. What is the justification for claiming that God 
possesses practical rationality in the sense that He cannot act without determining His 
actions on maxims? Kant would respond that to act without a maxim is to act on chance 
rather than to issue a volitional action. Having a will presupposes autonomy, which is to 
give oneself a law, a maxim. But why? Surely God can simply select an action from the 
infinite possibilities available to Him. This act of selection, if it comes from no cause 
beside God, seems adequate for volition. Why is a maxim also needed? Kant’s answer is 
that the concept of volition implies the concept of causality, and the concept of causality 
implies the concept of law: 
The concept of causality involves that of laws according to which something that 
we call cause must entail something else—namely, the effect. Therefore freedom 
is certainly not lawless, even though it is not a property of will in accordance with 
laws of nature. It must, rather, be a causality in accordance with immutable laws, 
which, to be sure, is of a special kind; otherwise a free will would be something 
absurd.32 
God’s volition must follow maxims because all efficient causes follow laws. Kant seems 
to be extending the principle that, in nature, like causes necessarily have like effects and 
applying it to free causal action. Now, even leaving aside the fact that the Muslim 
 





theologian does not grant that there is necessary causality in nature, this is simply a 
fallacious jump. Even granting that causality in nature obeys necessary and immutable 
laws, there is no reason to additionally grant that causality in free will also obeys 
necessary and immutable laws. An analysis of the concept of natural causality can 
provide no justification for the claim that free volition needs maxims. 
A more promising strategy might be just to stick to Kant’s previous definition of 
will as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with maxims. If will is 
defined in this way, it makes no sense to speak of a will that does not take a maxim. But a 
mere definition is no way of arguing for the substantive claim that God’s volitional 
agency requires maxims. The question becomes whether Kant’s definition of ‘will’ is 
adequate with respect to God’s will. The Muslim theologian answers that it is not. 
Consider again the idea of mere selection. When the Muslim theologian uses the term 
‘will’ in reference to God, he makes no implication of a maxim-making process; he 
means merely that God selects a possibility to create. There is no reason why this should 
not also be considered an instance of ‘willing.’ Thus, it seems more appropriate to restrict 
the definition, ‘a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with maxims’ to 
the term ‘practical reason,’ and to define ‘will’ or ‘volition’ more broadly as any sort of 
‘determining oneself to action.’ Even if we grant the success of Kant’s arguments about 
the nature of practical reason, and even if we grant his claims about the existence of 
objective principles, we are still not committed to his conclusions about volition. We are 
still not committed to the claim that free agents are necessarily rational agents. And since 
there is no reason for the Muslim theologian to suppose that God is a rational agent, he 





None of the three theories of practical reason, then, entails that God is bound by 
moral duties. In other words, it is a consistent, reasonable view to hold, as the Muslim 
theologian does, that God is not a rational agent. It is reasonable to hold that normative 
reasons do not apply to God. This is because we have no reason to believe that any 
account of practical reason, whether the Aristotelian account characterized by aiming at 
the good life or the Kantian account characterized by acting on maxims, adequately 
describes the nature of God’s will. In fact, the Muslim theologian believes that God’s 
will, as a divine attribute, is in principle unavailable to human comprehension. We can 
come to know, via negativa, what God’s will is not, but in the end we cannot understand 
the essential realities of God’s attributes. Thus, the very fact that the Aristotelian, 
Humean, and Kantian accounts of rationality are to us comprehensible normative theories 
is reason for the Muslim theologian to insist that they do not apply to God’s will. To 
Kant’s objection that this renders God’s actions rationally unintelligible, the Muslim 
theologian offers eager assent; God’s actions are unintelligible from the standpoint of our 
practical reason. To think otherwise would be to anthropomorphize divine volition. 
The upshot is that there is no good reason for the Muslim theologian to revise his 
belief that God cannot have normative reasons. Two consequences follow. First, he can 
coherently reject any NAE that depends on the existence of a duty to prevent suffering 
where that duty is conceived as rational precept. Second, if any prospect of a successful 
NAE remains in the dialectic against the Muslim theologian, it must be confined by a 
non-rationalistic view of morality—that is, it must be compatible with the view that 
moral requirements are not always accompanied by normative reasons, that there is not 





IV. The Appeal to Moral Intuition 
 
There is no doubt that our strongest moral intuitions support the judgement, ‘To allow 
preventable suffering is wrong,’ and it may seem intuitive that this judgement has some 
element of intrinsic truth such that it is applicable to all volitional agents, including God, 
in virtue of itself, and that this applicability is not contingent upon the particular nature of 
the volitional agent. Yet in this section I argue that the appeal to intuition is not sufficient 
for showing that moral obligations have this intrinsic quality. 
Let us begin by conceding for the sake of argument that intuitions are in fact a 
source of knowledge about the truth of at least some moral claims, including the one 
above.33 The claim, ‘To allow preventable suffering is wrong,’ is a “first order” or 
normative ethical proposition, a proposition that serves as an answer to questions about 
what actions are right or wrong. But accepting the claim above does not in itself entail 
any commitments on how to answer “second order” or metaethical questions—questions 
that ask about the nature of normative propositions, and about what we are doing when 
we ask “first order” normative questions.34 Depending on how we resolve metaethical 
questions, we could mean very different things by normative claims like the claim that it 
is morally obligatory to prevent suffering. And what we mean might not be what the 
atheologian needs us to mean in order for the NAE to work. 
 For the NAE to work, the claim that allowing preventable suffering is wrong must 
refer to an objective, universal prohibition that is non-rationally normative for all 
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volitional agents (or, alternatively, specifically for God, though I don’t imagine the 
atheologian would find it fruitful to push such an ad hoc metaethical view). Let us 
examine these three conditions in turn before deciding whether it is plausible to think 
such an entity exists. 
The condition first of all that the prohibition be objective rules out any 
subjectivism, nihilism, quasi-realism, or expressivism about morality. It is easy to see 
where nihilism, or error theory, runs afoul of the atheologian’s purposes here, for the 
view entails the falsity of the premise in the NAE that states that a morally perfect being 
prevents all suffering. As for subjectivist, expressivist, or quasi-realist views, the problem 
with them for the atheologian is that it makes no sense for a conclusion about God’s 
existence to be contingent upon subjective attitudes. The absurdity can be brought out if 
we imagine two people, one who maintains the above-mentioned premise in the NAE and 
another who does not: the conclusion that God does not exist becomes true “for” only one 
of them. But the conclusion sought by the atheologian is not that God “subjectively” does 
not exist, whatever that means. Because the atheologian wants the argument’s conclusion 
to say something objective about the world, all of its premises must make objective 
claims.35 Hence, if the atheologian is not prepared to give up his own favored version of 
anti-objectivism in metaethics, then he cannot consistently mount an external argument 
for the existence of moral obligations binding upon God. 
Second is the condition that the prohibition be universal or impersonal, applying 
in the same way to all volitional agents. This ensures that the prohibition applies to God 
without making that an arbitrary stipulation. The NAE would not succeed if the moral 
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prohibition on allowing preventable suffering applied only to agents with a specific 
nature, like possessing an imperfect, finite, or animal nature, or possessing practical 
reason, for this would exclude God from the prohibition. 
Third is the condition that the prohibition be non-rationally normative or 
prescriptive. By this slightly cumbersome language I mean that the prohibition must be 
able to guide or command the agent to comply, but that the source of that guiding or 
commanding cannot be the agent’s own rationality (since the appeal to this prohibition is 
supposed to be an alternative to the rationalism discussed in the previous section). The 
prescriptive nature of this moral injunction must not come in the form of a normative 
reason. 
What are we left with? For the atheologian’s appeal to intuition to work, our 
intuitive faculties must uncover an entity that imposes a universal requirement on all 
agents regardless of subjective attitudes. And somehow the entity must provide normative 
force in itself, directing all volitional agents to prevent suffering regardless of what they 
have normative reason to do. To borrow a phrase from J. L. Mackie, the entity would 
have to be a principle of “not-to-be-doneness somehow built into” the action of allowing 
preventable suffering.36 It would have to be a non-natural entity; it is difficult to see how 
such an entity would be a natural one, since naturalists usually explain the normativity of 
moral requirements37 either by offering a naturalistic account of reasons (and reasons are 
off limits here), or by treating the fundamental normative concept as what is ‘good for a 
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person,’ where this is understood as a complex natural property (including health, 
happiness, friendship, etc.) that it would be absurd to attribute to God.38 
 With all these metaethical strings attached, the appeal to the intuition that ‘To 
allow preventable suffering is wrong’ loses its force. The Muslim theologian holds an 
alternative, theological metaethics that understands moral precepts as divine commands 
addressed to created beings. But, of course, once it is understood in light of such a 
metaethical theory, the intuitive claim that allowing suffering is wrong can no longer be 
used as evidence that God is morally obligated to prevent suffering, since the theological 
theory flagrantly violates the condition of universality, the second condition discussed 
above. Now, the possibility of interpreting the claim in terms of divine command theory 
would not be a problem for the atheologian if the metaethical view described by the three 
conditions above was itself a much more plausible theory than divine command theory.39 
But I think this is clearly not the case. The metaethical account offered above carries no 
advantage in initial intuitive plausibility over a theological metaethics. 
The appeal to our moral intuitions, then, like the appeal to rational norms, is 
insufficient to show that God has a moral duty to prevent suffering. This exhausts the 
available ways of arguing that moral standards, and specifically the duty to prevent 
suffering, must be applicable to God. To be sure, what preceded thus far was not an 
argument that God has no moral obligations; it was merely the argument that this can be 
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consistently held. I take myself to have shown that the NAE is ineffective against the 
Muslim theologian. In what follows, I briefly address the DAAE. 
 
V. Divine Transcendence and Human Knowledge 
 
In Section II, I made the claim that the Muslim theologian can employ a variant on 
skeptical theism in the debate about the divine attribute formulation of the argument from 
evil. In this final section, I hope to show what such a view might look like. The DAAE, 
recall, claims that God would prevent much of the suffering present in our world even 
without a moral or rational requirement to do so. This is because, as traditionally 
conceived, God possesses the attributes of mercy, love, kindness, compassion, etc., and a 
being in possession of these attributes would will to prevent much of the suffering present 
in our world. 
The basic idea behind the response I propose is an appeal to the limitations of 
human knowledge in understanding the nature of God’s attributes. As I mentioned in the 
introduction, the DAAE presupposes adequate knowledge about the implications of 
God’s attributes for His willing the existence or nonexistence of suffering. It requires 
some translation or interpretation of God’s attributes into premises that serve as ‘quasi-
logical rules’ connecting the terms ‘divine mercy,’ ‘divine love,’ etc. and ‘suffering.’40 
For example, a formulation of the DAAE that centers on divine mercy would depend on 
something like the claim, ‘A being characterized by divine mercy would prevent the 
suffering of sentient creatures insofar as its power permits,’ or ‘A being characterized by 
divine mercy would prevent, insofar as it could, a certain threshold of suffering from 
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afflicting innocent victims like children or animals.’ The position I am advancing is that 
no such claim is epistemically justified. 
The key word is the ‘divine’ in divine mercy. God’s attributes, though they share 
their names with the names of familiar human characteristics, are, according to Islamic 
theology, utterly dissimilar in their essential reality. This is not just a quantitative 
difference (as in, God is infinitely merciful while our mercy is finite); it is a difference in 
kind.41 The prominent medieval theologian Abu Hamid al-Ghazali explains the 
relationship with a crude analogy: 
[W]hen we know ourselves to be powerful, knowing, living, speaking, and then 
hear those terms attributed to God—great and glorious…we understand them with 
an inadequate comprehension, much as the impotent person understood the 
pleasure of intercourse from what was described for him of the pleasure of sweets. 
Indeed, our life, power, and understanding are farther from the life, power, and 
understanding of God—great and glorious—than sugar’s sweetness is from the 
pleasure of intercourse. In fact, there is no correspondence between them.42 
God is described in familiar terms for the sake of “establishing imaginings and 
likenesses,” so that we have at least some starting point from which to think about the 
Divine.43 But a mere starting point is not sufficient grounds from which to derive the 
quasi-logical rules necessary for the DAAE. 
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 Of course, the “no correspondence” claim should not be taken to imply that we 
are completely in the dark about God’s attributes. Ghazali himself explains that divine 
mercy means “pouring out benefaction to those in need” and that God’s loving-kindness 
means that He “wishes all creatures well and accordingly favours them and praises 
them.”44 But these are just general statements, not quasi-logical rules. The difference is 
that to interpret an attribute through a rule is to demand from it consistent human 
intelligibility. But manner in which the divine attributes are manifested should not be 
expected to fall consistently within the boundaries of human intelligibility. We intuit 
vaguely that “pouring out benefaction to those in need” is a virtue—in God, a 
perfection—but the Muslim theologian recognizes that divine perfection is an 
unconditioned totality, and cannot be reduced to a utilitarian-like benefaction calculus so 
as to be within human comprehension. God’s mercy to created beings is but one aspect of 
the totality that is divine perfection; God is not praised for merely the pleasure He gives 
us and the pain He wards off from us but for the perfect interplay of the divine names, 
aspects of the divine nature, in creation. God is at once the Benefiter and the Afflicter; the 
Giver and the Withholder; the Tender and the Majestic; He Who Raises and He Who 
Abases.45 He possesses these names and attributes necessarily, because of what He is, and 
not contingently upon what He freely wills and does.46 Suffering, as God’s creation, 
manifests some aspects of His perfect nature, such as His names of Afflicter, Responder 
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to Supplications, and Restorer. But as particular existents within the nexus of divine 
activity, the instances of suffering that exist give us no reason to think that they capture, 
in themselves, anything like the full picture of a perfect created order—much less of a 
perfect Creator. 
To reiterate, the Muslim theologian should be skeptical that we can adequately 
understand, merely on account of what can be observed in the world of either suffering or 
wellbeing, what it means for God to be absolutely and uniquely perfect. He should also 
be skeptical that we have anything like complete knowledge of what qualifies as the 
doings of an absolutely and uniquely perfect being such that we could either predict what 
God “ought to do,” qua perfectly merciful or loving, or retrospectively assess whether 
what was done passes the bar for perfect mercy or love. The point of shifting the 
discussion away from the NAE is to avoid making problematic reference to some 
independent normative order, whether the norms in question are the norms of morality or 
some quasi-norms of mercy or loving-kindness. Skeptical theism with regard to the 
DAAE is simply the contention that God’s mercy, love, and other attributes are 
conditioned by His perfection, and that the nature of unconditioned divine perfection is 
beyond our ken. 
The objection may be raised against the position I have just outlined that some 
traditional divine attributes are intrinsically normative, and that the distinction I have 
made between the NAE and the DAAE is therefore misleading or confused. God’s 
goodness and justice in particular are likely to be cited in this vein. Contemporary 
philosophers who think of God’s moral agency as a non-negotiable tenet of traditional 





It is certainly true that God is called good and just, so if this entails that God is a moral 
agent then the claim that there is no moral standard by which God’s actions can be 
assessed falls apart, as does the version of skeptical theism I just presented. Let me 
therefore address the objection as it pertains first to divine ‘goodness’ and then to divine 
‘justice.’ 
Mark Murphy writes that goodness is “a fixed point concerning God’s nature…. 
If one were to deny that God is good (understood de dicto—that is, ‘if there is a being 
that qualifies as God, then that being is good’), then one would call one’s own 
competence in use of the term ‘God’ into question.”47 This seems right, but then Murphy 
goes on to add, without qualification or explanation, that “For God to be good is for God 
to be morally good.”48 This move is typical. But if Murphy means that the attribution of 
moral goodness is a “fixed point” that regulates correct usage of the term ‘God,’ then his 
analysis is simply wrong; as I have pointed out, the Islamic theological tradition does not 
think of God in this way. Divine goodness on the Islamic conception would be more 
adequately conceived as synonymous with benevolence or mercy. Perhaps this is best 
explained by the fact that no word in Arabic that mean benevolence is nearly as 
normatively loaded as the English word ‘good,’ or enjoys as rich a philosophical history. 
The bottom line is that when the Muslim theologian calls God ‘good’ he does not intend 
to use an intrinsically normative or evaluative term; he means that God is benevolent, and 
the only evaluative implication is that divine goodness, like any divine attribute, is a 
perfection. 
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As for divine justice, many Muslim theologians understood God to be just simply 
by definition, in virtue of His sovereignty rather than His contingent choices and actions. 
To cite Ghazali again, 
[I]njustice is inapplicable to God due to pure negation, just as being oblivious is 
inapplicable to a wall and being frivolous to the wind. For injustice is imaginable 
on the part of someone whose act might affect what belongs to another, yet this is 
unimaginable with respect to God (Exalted is He), or on the part of someone who 
is under the command of another and acts in a way that is contrary to this 
command….Thus injustice is inapplicable to someone who cannot be imagined to 
infringe upon the property of another or to be under the command of another. This 
is because the necessary condition for injustice is absent; it is not because such a 
one lacks something in himself.49 
The point is that it would be logically impossible for God to be unjust; God is just by the 
fact that, qua God, He is sovereign over all of His creation and nothing is in a position to 
put Him under obligations. 
To praise God for His goodness, then, is to praise Him for the perfection that is 
manifest in His benevolence to us; to praise God for His justice is to praise Him for the 
perfection entailed by His absolute sovereignty. Neither divine perfection requires the 
possibility of assessment by some independent moral standard. Indeed, for the skeptical 
theist position that I have just sketched out, no human standard could ever be adequate in 
confirming or assessing God’s perfection. 
 
 







I began this paper by pointing out that the NAE depends on the claim that God has a 
moral obligation to prevent suffering. Because the Muslim theologian denies this, it is the 
burden of the atheologian to produce an argument for the premise that God, if He exists, 
does indeed have a moral obligation to prevent suffering. I have argued that the 
atheologian cannot demonstrate this to be true, whether he appeals to rational norms of 
volition or to our moral intuitions. Because the Muslim theologian can coherently 
maintain that God’s agency is not governed by norms of reason, the atheologian must 
appeal to intrinsically prescriptive non-natural entities to make the case that God has 
moral obligations. But the theologian can reject this appeal without much intuitive cost. 
Again, I don’t claim to have demonstrated that God cannot have moral obligations or 
normative reasons; I have argued only that this can be coherently maintained. This is all 
that is necessary in response to the charge of rational incoherence posed against theism 
by the argument from evil. 
 One outcome of the preceding argument is the suggestion that it is really the 
DAAE that represents the interesting field of theodicy for Islamic theology. I gave 
reasons to think that the Muslim theologian has the resources to mount a successful 
response in the form of a variant on skeptical theism. One advantage of this response is 
that it avoids the worries about moral skepticism that accompany some forms of skeptical 
theism in the contemporary literature. Perhaps another advantage is the opportunity it 
gives the Muslim theologian to reflect on God’s transcendent perfection and His 
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